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HAS CONGRESS ABDICATED ITS LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO 
ITS STAFF? 
DENNIS J. TUCHLER* 
The submissions to this program examine the current status of Madison’s 
plan for the preservation of republican government against the forces of faction 
and the threat of tyranny.1  To assure the preservation of liberty, the executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers were distributed in a way that kept power from 
dangerous concentration in the hands of one branch.2  To assure that law is 
made “with the consent of the governed,”3 and the activity of legislation was 
conducted “consonant to the public good,”4 free from domination by faction, 
the legislative power was conferred on a representative assembly, the Congress 
of the United States. The constituency of each member of this congress is so 
populous that the influence of faction is drowned in the numbers of voters who 
select each member of Congress.  Even if some faction took control in one or 
more constituencies, that faction would be made ineffective by the large 
number of elected members in either house of Congress.5  If legislative power 
accrues to the executive branch, protection against tyranny provided by the 
separation of powers is weakened.  If legislative power is exercised by other 
than persons elected by the people of the United States, the legitimacy 
conferred on legislation by its having been consented to by the people’s 
representatives in Congress, is called into question.  The focus in this program 
has been on the first concern — the separation of powers.  This paper raises the 
second question, whether law making today is truly “with the consent of the 
governed”6 when much of the legislative activity leading up to the official act 
of a member of Congress with respect to that legislation, is carried out 
primarily by the legislative staff.  Has Congress abdicated substantial 
legislative authority to its own staff?  If it has ceded power to the staff by 
reliance on it for information and the execution of primary legislative 
 
* Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law. 
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
 2. Id. 
 3. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 5. Id. 
 6. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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functions,7 it has done so in part in defense of the separation of powers. 
Without such staff, Congress would depend even more than it does on the 
Executive branch (and on lobbyists representing private interests) for most of 
its information, and the initiation of a substantial part of Congress’s legislative 
solutions for current problems of the Union. 
As has been noted in other contributions to this program, abdication of 
legislative function differs from delegation of function to another branch of 
government.  The latter is made, at least in theory, by design, which includes 
the possibility that it can be regulated or reversed by later legislative action.  
Abdication of legislative authority is inadvertent, compelled by the 
circumstances of legislation and the multiplicity of problems taken up by the 
federal government for treatment, if not cure.  Abdication of legislative 
function to unelected participants in the legislative process, is in furtherance of 
the legislative function.  If Congress did not need it, the conferral of power 
over the legislative product upon staff would not have been made. 
In terms of the quality of the legislative product, the conferral, whether by 
design or abdication, may not be a bad thing.  Indeed, this arrangement of 
legislative function might enhance the degree to which law making responds to 
national needs.  If the legislative result is of good quality, why does it matter 
that much of the process of finding and formulating issues and fashioning the 
legislative response to them is in the hands of unelected but intelligent and 
talented staff members who are, after all, under the supervisory control of a 
member of Congress?  Still, if legislation is to retain its democratic cachet, 
there must be a line beyond which delegation cannot go.  That is, there may be 
non-delegable legislative functions — functions that must be exercised by 
legislators authorized to legislate under Article I if legislative product is truly 
consented to by the governed. If there are such functions, what are they?  If 
they are not properly delegable and not properly exercised by other than an 
elected member of Congress, to what extent can the exercise of these functions 
be aided by persons other than the one who is to perform them?8 
The working life of a Senator or Representative in the Congress of the 
United States is taken up primarily with three kinds of activities.  They provide 
services to constituents, mainly by aiding these constituents in their struggles 
 
 7. By “primary legislative functions” I mean all those steps from gathering information and 
formulating issues to the drafting of legislative proposals and the decision as to how to proceed 
with respect to proposed legislation. 
 8. The question raised in this paper is different from the question of delegability of duties 
by agents, or the related question of whether a lawyer delegates so much responsibility in a matter 
to a person who is not a member of the relevant bar as to be chargeable with aiding in the 
unauthorized practice of law.  The issue is not one of liability to a principal or prevention of harm 
to a client from inexpert or disloyal activities by subagents.  Raised in this paper is the legitimacy 
of a demand on the people of the United States that they act in conformity with statutes enacted 
by the federal government. 
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with the federal government and providing information about pending 
legislation.  They engage in legislative and oversight activity. They gather 
money and support for the coming election and spend time in the home district 
mending political fences and reinforcing political support.  The time spent on 
legislative and oversight activity is notoriously insufficient to assure even 
formal service to the image of a representative fully engaged in oversight of 
the government and the fashioning and enactment of legislation.  Most of the 
legislative activity in either house of Congress is done in committee and 
subcommittee.  The membership of these committees does not reflect the 
distribution of interests and political positions in the house as a whole, and the 
products of these committees are rarely considered in depth, if at all, by all 
members much less by nonmembers of the committees or their staffs.9  The 
more a member of Congress participates in committee work, the greater is that 
member’s potential influence on legislation.  On the other hand, the more 
committees on which the member serves, the less potential impact that member 
has on any one committee’s work.  The degree to which committee work takes 
the time of each member of Congress is strictly up to that member.  Senators 
are members of three committees and several subcommittees.  In the House of 
Representatives, some members serve on only one committee and no 
subcommittees,10 while others join many more.11  Plainly, then, the picture of 
legislation as the result of collegial effort and consent by the representatives of 
all the nation assembled in Congress is false.  The legitimacy of representative 
institutions in a democracy depends on the representative institutions’ 
somehow “standing for” the people represented.  But, even if the membership 
of Congress were the mirror of the nation, the committees are not mirrors of 
Congress in terms of ideology or the distribution of regional concerns.  Finally, 
the votes of members of Congress in committee and on the floor of each house 
are not fully informed and often not informed at all except with respect to the 
broad outlines of the laws they are consenting to by their votes.12  But, even if 
it were otherwise — even if each committee represented well the house it 
serves, and even if each committee’s product was the result of the efforts of all 
 
 9. For a discussion of the scope and depth of participation by members of Congress, see 
RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS (1996). 
 10. Representative William Clay is one such member, available at http://www.house.gov/ 
clay/bio.htm (last visited August 31, 2000). 
 11. Mary Bono, for example, serves on three committees and five subcommittees.  She is 
also chair of the Congressional Salton Sea Task Force and co-chair of the Entertainment Task 
Force and Travel and Tourism Task Force, available at http://www.house.gov/bono/bio.htm (last 
visited August 31, 2000). 
 12. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 9, at 32. Because of the immense amount of information 
needed to think intelligently about all the matters before Congress, many members of Congress 
become “specialists” by limiting their efforts to particular areas of national concern — normally 
areas that are of concern to their constituencies.  Id. 
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its members, it is not at all clear that the members know very much about the 
legislation they are producing, most of the time.  The knowledge they have and 
the decisions they make with respect to legislation is the result of work by 
others, primarily staff members. 
For each member of Congress and for each committee and subcommittee 
of either house of Congress there are employed a substantial number of staff, 
who manage the day-to-day legislative work of the members and committees, 
and care for the members political needs, with respect to both their 
constituencies and their status in the house in which they serve.13  The relative 
importance of legislative and political concerns vary with the member of 
Congress. The function of the staff is, among other things, to enable the 
member of Congress to obtain and react to information about matters that 
concern that member.  This reduces dependence for such information and for 
legislative ideas on the Executive branch of the government and interest 
groups.  As access to information increases, so does the amount of information 
obtained and the need for help in managing that information and reacting to it 
in terms of legislation.14  “The members [of Congress] cannot begin to control 
the workload their staffs collectively help to generate.  Yet Congress could not 
function in today’s world without the staff on which it has come to depend.”15  
The staff arranges hearings, drafts bills and engages in negotiation with respect 
to at least the initial form of legislative proposals.  Indeed, the staff affects 
every step in the legislative process. They can run committee investigations, 
the results of which they can leak to the media thereby influencing what 
members of Congress decide is important enough for a legislative response.  
According to a respected observer of Congress, 
Once a bill is on the agenda, the staff works to assemble a coalition behind it, 
arranging detailed amendments with other staff members and with interest 
group representatives to broaden support for the bill without sacrificing the 
goals the [relevant committee] chairman, often at their urging, has adopted.  
When conflicts cannot be resolved, the member may then learn enough about 
the details to weigh the political costs of compromise.  But even then, the role 
of the member is clearly limited.  As former Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa) once 
 
 13. In 1999, there were 9,636 staff personnel in the House of Representatives, 6,391 in the 
Senate, and 104 serving joint committees.  There are also staff in support agencies: General 
Accounting Office (3,275), Congressional Research Service (747), and Congressional Budget 
Office (232).  NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, ET AL., AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC 
POLICY RESEARCH, VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 1999 – 2000, at 129-32 tbl. 5-1 
(Congressional Quarterly, Inc.1999).  See also id. at 132 figure 5-1 (indicating the dramatic 
change in number of staff since 1890, especially after 1970). 
 14. “Without its staff, Congress would quickly become the prisoner of outside sources of 
information in the executive branch and interest groups.” MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECTED 
REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 5 (1980). 
 15. Id. at 4. 
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said, “there is no question about our enormous dependency and their influence.  
In all legislation, they’re the ones that lay out the options”.16 
In all cases, the staff usually sees itself as furthering the policy objectives of 
the members they serve.17 
Speaking of a matter before a Senate committee, Malbin notes: 
Only a few senators seemed to follow or care about the details of the bill, but 
they all seemed to know exactly how it might affect them politically . . . What 
the senators did not seem to know or care about, however, were the different 
substantive options the staff was considering when differences in substance 
had no political impact.18 
The functioning unit of Congress is the “enterprise” rather than the elected 
member of Congress.19  The enterprise consists of the staff at the member’s 
disposal, with the member playing the role of chief executive.  The member is 
the source of ideological bias for the staff’s work.  The staff does the work of 
selecting issues, and fashioning legislative responses to those issues.  The 
member whom the staff serves may play a decisive role at any stage of the 
process of developing legislation or a position with respect to legislation, or 
 
 16. Id. at 4-5 (footnote omitted). 
 17. The staff of a committee normally views itself as serving the Chairman of that 
committee.  There are some differences between staff that view themselves as “professional” and 
those that consider their mission more “political.”  The former see their function as laying out 
alternative options, leaving decision to the committee.  According to Malbin, the more political 
seem more useful. 
Our examination of nonpartisan staffs has uncovered a crucial distinction between 
professional staffs that confine themselves to laying out options or suggesting possible 
compromises and equally professional staffs that do independent policy analysis and, in 
some instances, make recommendations.  The former have an easier time maintaining 
their nonpartisan credibility but, however useful they may be, they seem to be unable to 
serve Congress’s needs. 
Id. at 204. 
 18. Id. at 74.  As to another legislative matter, involving conflict between a bill passed in the 
Senate and one passed in the House, dealing with the same subject, Malbin noted: 
Key staff people simply sat down for three days . . . and resolved the differences between 
the two bills. These differences went well beyond monetary questions to ones of policy, 
that the committee members saw as issues of principle.  As a result, the staff level 
compromise was no simple split-the-difference affair.  To find some common ground 
between the interests of the key members of the House and Senate, the staffs had to come 
up with imaginative new formulations significantly changing existing law.  These 
formulations, some of which had never been discussed previously in either chamber, were 
ratified by key committee members and adopted unanimously, with virtually no 
debate . . . 
Id. at 76.  Richard L. Hall observed that legislative assistants attend subcommittee meetings for 
their bosses, and do the preparation work for most meetings.  HALL, supra note 9, at 89. 
 19. See DAVID WHITEMAN, COMMUNICATION IN CONGRESS, MEMBERS, STAFF AND THE 
SEARCH FOR INFORMATION 3-6 (1995). 
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she may play merely a final, ratifying role with respect to legislation on which 
that member votes.20 
To the extent that the member of Congress serves as an agent of her 
constituency, the staff is quite helpful.  It gathers information from the 
constituency and provides for the appropriate response.  There is little 
discretion to be exercised here, except insofar as it relates to ignoring requests 
for help or refusing to provide particular help to the complaining constituent.  I 
doubt that there is any fear that the staff usurps the legislator’s function in this 
respect.  Similarly, the role of staff in the search for campaign funding raises 
no signals warning of usurpation of essential functions.  The question as to 
whether the staff usurps legislative function goes to the legislative and 
oversight functions.  The only official act of a member of Congress is to vote, 
either in committee or on the floor.  That function has not been delegated to 
staff.  But a vote comes at the end of a process of legislating in which the 
member can be, but often is not involved directly. Such involvement as there is 
often occurs through the agency of staff, which gathers information, digests it 
and presents it to the member, and provides guidance with respect to the 
legislator’s next move.  The result is a decision by the elected member of 
Congress based mainly on a large number of previous decisions as to what is 
 
 20. MALBIN, supra note 14, at 28-36.  According to Professor Hall: 
[I]t is not so much the member per se, but the member’s enterprise that acts in the 
legislative deliberations of Congress.  Salisbury and Shepsle . . . correctly emphasize that 
in the contemporary Congress, members are akin to leaders of organized enterprises, 
which include not only the principal or CEO but numerous staff members who serve as 
their agents. Indeed, it is often one of the member’s legislative assistants or the legislative 
director, not the member herself, who screens issues, alerts her to various legislative 
opportunities, briefs her on the ‘upside’ opportunities and the ‘downside’ risks, and 
otherwise helps determine the priorities of the office.  Information the staff provide to 
their boss thus becomes an important basis for her perceptions of particular bills.  The 
boss’s reactions to staffers’ recommendations, in turn, form the basis of staff perceptions 
of how the boss perceives her interests. 
None of this is to say that members are somehow ciphers, as institutional critics 
sometimes charge.  On the contrary, the agent’s impulse to learn and then faithfully 
represent her principal’s interests is exceedingly strong in the legislative context.  Perhaps 
the first and most important job of the new legislative assistant is to absorb as much 
information as possible about the member’s district and the member’s policy interests.  To 
unwittingly recommend some action that the boss recognizes as politically dangerous, for 
instance, is the surest way to lose credibility within the enterprise.  To act in a way that 
ultimately causes electoral harm, legislative embarrassment, or a violation of the 
representative’s policy interests is the surest way to lose one’s job.  In an attempt to 
anticipate and correctly represent their boss’s interests, legislative staffers employ a 
number of information sources, including past speeches and statements; consultations 
with the legislative director, administrative assistant, or other staffers; and of course 
consultations with the member herself. 
HALL, supra note 9, at 77-78. 
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important and relevant to the member’s needs,21 the members own policy 
preferences, and the member’s calculation of the political costs and benefits of 
the decision. 
At what point does the work of the staff defeat the ideal of government 
with the consent of the governed, and become government primarily by 
unelected bureaucrats? This question is properly posed with respect to those 
making decisions in all three branches of the government.  The courts have 
their law clerks, and the executive agencies have a thick layer of staff between 
the beginning and the end of administrative decision making, engaged in 
sorting and analyzing data and making preliminary decisions as to the shape 
and content of executive decisions.  The question of abdication of function is 
dealt with here only with respect to legislation in Congress to the way in which 
legislation is consented to by the governed.  What counts as that consent, 
which may be given only by the governed or their representatives?  If that 
function is exhausted by a somewhat informed vote, then there is no difficulty 
at all with any assumption of the pre-vote processing of legislation by 
unelected staff.  The resulting legislation has the required pedigree and its 
democratic cachet is preserved in its quality.  But what if the vote is taken after 
much of the process of decision making that led to this vote was in the hands 
of the staff, which is responsible to, and responsive to, but not guided by the 
member whose vote is required?  Moreover, what if this predominance of staff 
influence is the result, not of failure on the part of the member to do her job 
properly, but rather of the normal process of legislating for the Nation.  It is not 
that the member will not, but rather that the member cannot do more. 
In a way, assigning the preliminary work of legislation to the staff serves 
Madison’s goal of eliminating faction and assuring a focus on the needs of the 
Union and its people.  The personal and committee staffs in both houses are 
made up of people, most of whom live in and expect to make their fortunes in 
the Washington, DC area.  They look forward to working in various capacities 
in both the Executive and Legislative branches, or as lobbyists based in the 
District of Columbia, dealing with friends and former associates serving 
Congress or the executive branch.  Their outlook is partisan22 and national 
 
 21. There is an important distinction between two kinds of staff — that staff that pursues the 
ends of the member to whom their loyalty is due, and that staff which treats its task as simply 
working out the policy implications of various alternative approaches to particular issues, and 
presenting those alternatives in all their fullness.  The former will present a product that is biased 
according to the assumed wishes of the member for whom the job is done.  That will include only 
those alternatives that the member is likely to accept with recommendations as to which 
alternative is the best.  The latter will present a product that is biased by the staff’s own view of 
what is workable and appropriate, and includes no explicit recommendations of the best of the 
many alternatives presented. Both kinds of staff are discussed in MALBIN, supra note 14. 
 22. The staff is partisan in both senses — adherence to a political party and personal loyalty 
to the member whom the staff serves. 
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rather than local unless their role on the staff is to take note of and respond (or 
recommend a response) to matters of importance in a member’s constituency.  
On the other hand, the disconnection between staff and the member’s 
constituency must reduce the degree to which the preliminary decisions made 
by staff with respect to issues to be raised and the shape of legislation to be 
proposed or voted dilute the degree to which the enterprise made up of staff 
and member actually represents the constituency insofar as that constituency is 
different from other parts of the United States. 
What, at minimum, is expected of a member of Congress by either those 
who vote in the member’s constituency or by those who observe Congress in 
terms of its function in a democratic republic?  If either minimum expectation 
is not met, then the adoption or rejection of legislation is not properly the 
“consent of the governed.”  Is more than the bare vote expected?  Is it enough 
that a reasonably informed member be told enough about a legislative proposal 
to support a decision for or against it?  Or must more than the final choice with 
respect to legislation be made by elected members, and with more than a 
passing understanding of what it is that the vote is about? 
A representative is sent by a constituency to engage in the process of 
legislation in the name of the constituents.  Whether the representative 
represents all the constituency or only those who voted for that agent is 
irrelevant to this inquiry.  Is this agent sent to deal only with matters of direct 
concern to the constituency, or to the economic or other interests of the people 
who sent the member to Washington?  Madison envisaged Congress as the 
People in microcosm, freed of the influence of faction. The people of the 
United States met by proxy on matters of national importance.23  On such a 
view, a member’s function was not limited to those matters in of direct concern 
to the member’s constituents.  It extended to consenting to all legislation not 
directly affecting his constituency — even legislation opposed by members 
representing a constituency that would be affected directly by it, so long as the 
legislator judged it desirable and “consonant to the public good.”24  On such a 
view the duties of a member must include being sufficiently informed to aid in 
the deliberations25 and cast a thoughtful vote with respect to all legislation 
before the house.  This vote to change (or not to change) the law, cast after 
deliberation and debate in which those opposed are heard by all who vote, is 
 
 23. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (stating that legislators are similar to 
judges with respect to issues before them, comparing legislation to adjudication); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (It is essential that the members be derived from and 
elected directly or indirectly by the people.).  There were 65 members of the first House of 
Representatives and 26 Senators.  See U.S. CONST. art.  I, §§ 2 - 3. That is, both houses were 
small enough for one to imagine general thoughtful discussion of issues before them. 
 24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 25. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 78-79 (2000) (noting that deliberation is an end in itself). 
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the desired consent of the governed.  Can such consent be given by the 
participants in the federal legislative process? 
However normatively attractive the vision of legislation in the preceding 
paragraph is, is it empirically accurate?  If it is not, does that mean that the 
project of representative democracy has failed to provide a government whose 
powers are exercised by or with the consent of the governed?  There is another 
view of the political process which sees legislation in terms of economics.  If 
this approach is empirically accurate, does it leave us with the picture of a 
government which exercises its just powers with the consent of the governed? 
What if a representative were most accurately seen as representing the 
economic interests (at least the dominant interests) in the constituency 
represented?  Legislation would then be best understood as the result of 
bargains struck in behalf of interest groups by the people’s representatives.  
That is, rather than avoiding the influence of factions, the legislative process 
may be entirely a matter of adjusting the competing claims of factions.26  If this 
view is sound, then consent is given to the outcome of bargains, and all the 
consenting legislators need know is the actual effect of the proposed legislation 
on the various interest groups involved.  It should not matter how the 
information is obtained, so long as it is reasonably accurate.  Staff work, on 
this view, enhances the ability of members of Congress to develop legislation 
and cast their votes, so long as the member is reasonably certain that the 
information received from the staff is accurate and the groundwork provided 
by staff through drafting and negotiation is suitable to the bargain sought.  
Indeed, the most valuable information and work should come, not from staff, 
but from the representatives of organized interest groups.  On the assumption 
that all relevant interests are represented in the bargaining process and the 
bargaining is fair, one can say that any legislative outcome is consented to by 
(in the name of) the governed, all of whom are parties by proxy to those 
bargains in which they are concerned. 
The strong version of neither of these two views of the legislative process 
can give us an adequate picture of modern legislation.  A weaker version of 
either, purporting to cover “most” rather than “all” of the legislative process is 
easier to accept but leaves us at sea as to the adequacy of the member’s 
participation in that process to give the legislative product the seal of 
democratic approval.27  Under either approach, there remains unanswered the 
question, when is representation adequate?  Is it adequate when the elected 
member depends on staff, chosen without the participation of the member’s 
constituents, for ideas as to goals to achieve, the formulation of legislative 
 
 26. Legislation as the outcome of interest group conflict is treated in ESKRIDGE, supra note 
25, at 81-97. 
 27. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE, A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION (1991) (discussing competing views of the political process). 
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solutions to promote, and information sufficient to enable the member of 
Congress to function intelligently with respect to the legislative material before 
him.  If it is not, it is because it cannot be, given the scope and amount of work 
taken up by the federal government.  Put slightly differently, it had better be 
adequate because there is no going back to the days in which members of 
congress were substantially in control of the fashioning of legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to maintain its independence of the Executive Branch, and 
representatives of particular interests, Congress has come to depend on staff, 
hired by each house of Congress to serve the legislative needs of individual 
legislators and committees.  Commentators have noted that the work done by 
staff affects whether and how issues are addressed to an increasing degree.  
Indeed, it is not unreasonable to assume that most matters before the Congress 
are better understood in terms of their content and supporting data by staff than 
by the members whom the staff serve and whose vote is necessary to the 
adoption or rejection of legislative proposals. The question arises whether the 
actual participation of the elected member in the legislative process is adequate 
in terms of the requirement of a representative democracy that government be 
with the consent of the governed.  Is the bare act of voting enough—is it 
enough that a majority of members voting on a particular measure has voted to 
adopt or to reject it?  Or must that vote be cast only after debate which is 
meaningful in terms of the final shape of the legislative proposal and informed 
by the informed arguments of those who support and those who oppose the 
proposal?  The latter is the vision of Madison and those who love democracy 
but accept representative government as a reasonable (because necessary) 
second best option.  That vision is not in no way correct unless one views the 
vote as having been cast by an enterprise, itself fulfilling the function of 
representation because it is led, but not controlled, by an elected member of 
Congress. 
 
